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Abstract: A common view is that species occupy a unique position on the Tree of 
Life.  Evaluating this claim this requires an understanding of what the Tree of 
Life represents.  The Tree represents history, but there are a least three biological 
levels that are often said to have genealogies: species, organisms, and genes.  
Here I focus on defending the plausibility of a gene-based account of the Tree.  
This leads to an account of species that are determined by gene genealogies.  On 
this view, an exclusive group is a group of organisms that forms a clade for a 
higher proportion of the genome than any conflicting clade.  Taxa occupy a 
unique position in what can be called the 'primary concordance tree'.  But each 
gene has its own historical 'tree of life'.  I conclude by arguing that both 
organismal pedigrees with their corresponding Tree as well as gene genealogies 
and their trees are objectively real and play important, but different, roles in 
biological practice.   
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1 Introduction 
Biological systematics is often said to be in the business of recovering the Tree of 
Life.  The Tree is supposed to be the great record of the evolutionary history of all 
life and it represents how all life on earth is descended from a common ancestor.  
One understanding of the Tree is that it is a record of the history of species and 
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speciations (Wiley [1981]; Cracraft and Donoghue [2004]; Dawkins [2004]; 
Hodkinson and Parnell [2006]).  However, there are numerous different species 
concepts in the literature (25 are listed in Wilkins [2009]), and different species 
concepts lead to different histories of speciation and so on this understanding of 
the Tree, to multiple, incompatible, Trees of Life.  Therefore, it might appear that 
there can be no single, objective Tree (LaPorte [2005]).  However, the species 
problem has no immediate bearing on the objectivity of the Tree as the Tree of 
Life is metaphysically prior to, and independent of, any particular species concept 
that we choose (Velasco [2008]).  For example, many systematists doubt the 
existence of species in Bacteria (Mayr [2001]; Franklin [2007]) yet there is no 
doubt that bacteria belong on the Tree of Life.   
If the Tree of Life does not depend on our classification system, then what 
does it depend on?  The answer is that it depends on evolutionary history – in 
particular, genealogical history.  But this does not settle the meaning, for there are 
multiple ways of understanding genealogy.  We have seen one way – the 
genealogy of species.  However, there are at least two other levels of biological 
organization that have genealogical histories – organisms and genes.   
One way to understand how there could be an objective genealogy for 
bacteria even if they do not form species is to recognize that bacteria are 
organisms with particular genealogies at that level of organization.  As organisms, 
they are genealogically connected to all other life and to each other and it might 
be these organismal connections that the Tree represents.  We could think of the 
entire Tree in this way.  This is what Doolittle and Bapteste ([2007]) call 'the tree 
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of cells'.  On some views of species, this conclusion contradicts the view that the 
Tree of Life shows how species are connected.  However, a better option is to 
hold on to the view that the Tree of Life represents the history of species, and 
require that we use a species concept where the genealogy of a species is 
determined by the genealogical histories of the organisms that make up that 
species.  This is the strategy used by defenders of some versions of the 
Phylogenetic Species Concept.  On this view, species are units of phylogeny, and 
so must be groups of organisms united by a shared history (Mishler and 
Donoghue [1982]; Baum and Donoghue [1995]).  With the right definition of 
species, the Tree of Life can represent the history of species and of organisms at 
the same time.  In this way, we have a basis for phylogenetic classification.  In 
such a system, only clades can be taxa.  Since which groups are clades depends on 
the Tree, our classification depends on the Tree, not the other way around. 
 It is important to note that the question of what the Tree of Life is matters 
for all aspects of systematics and not just for classification.  A correct 
phylogenetic tree is just a subtree of the full Tree of Life and so any area that 
depends on phylogenies—which is a huge portion of modern biology—depends 
on the Tree even if we decide that taxa need not be clades or that species need not 
be phylogenetic units.   
 
2 The organism centered view of the Tree 
It is possible to spell out a genealogical species concept according to which the 
genealogy of a species is completely determined by the genealogy of the 
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organisms in the species.  Here each taxon will have a unique place on the Tree of 
Life (and therefore a unique genealogy) as long as each taxon forms an exclusive 
group of organisms.  This means, roughly, that everything in the group is more 
closely related to the rest of the group than to anything outside it (de Queiroz and 
Donoghue [1990]; Velasco [2008], [2009]). 
 Such a species concept would ignore all other considerations such as the 
character states of particular organisms.  This 'reductive'1 understanding of species 
genealogy gives us a picture of what taxa are, sets the metaphysical stage that 
allows us to have a concept of the genealogy of taxa, and gives us a picture of one 
possible meaning of 'the Tree of Life' (Velasco [2009]). 
 Although this view leaves us with a questionable metaphor since the Tree 
of Life is no longer strictly a tree in the mathematical sense of each node having 
exactly one parent, it does solve many potential problems of the species-
genealogy view of the Tree.  For example, many traditional species concepts do 
not seem to apply across the whole of the Tree.  In addition, many traditionally 
recognized species seem to have multiple histories or inconsistent phylogenetic 
connections because these groups are paraphyletic or even polyphyletic.  Both 
problems are apparently solved by thinking at the organismal level. 
 But in fact, organisms are not the panacea that this view makes them seem 
to be.  Though of broader scope than 'species', it is not obvious that the concept of 
'organism' applies everywhere that we could do phylogenetic studies.  For 
example, a famous phylogenetic study of varying strains of HIV was used by the 
CDC to prove that a Florida dentist was passing the virus to his patients (Palca 
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[1992]; Smith and Waterman [1992]).  However, if organisms must be able to 
reproduce relatively independently of other organisms, then viruses will not be 
organisms and there is no organismal history here that permits one to make sense 
of the phylogeny.  While it is by no means clear what sufficient and necessary 
conditions there might be for being an organism, many of the proposed definitions 
will leave viruses out (Wilson [2005]). 
 More general concerns about what organisms are threaten to undermine 
their usefulness for phylogenetics.  For example, we could ask whether or not a 
human organism includes its gut flora (the trillions of microorganisms that live in 
our digestive tracts).  Symbiotic relationships such as these are widespread 
through all branches of life (Wilson [2005]).  If organisms are defined in terms of 
some type of functional or causal dependency, then surely gut flora are part of the 
human organism.  We could not live without them.  But if this is the case, an 
organism does not have a single genealogy, but rather, has many parts, which may 
have different genealogies.   
 The biological situation might then be parallel to the history of an ordinary 
physical object such as a car.  It is clear that different parts of a car such as its 
engine, tires, or steering column might have different histories and in some 
contexts, asking about 'the' history of the car just seems to be asking about the 
history of its various parts.2  An obvious way to attempt to avoid this in the 
biological case is by defining organisms (or at least 'organisms' for the purpose of 
our definition of taxa) in such a way that the gut flora is made up of trillions of 
different organisms, each with its own genealogy, while the human organism, 
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which does not include the gut flora, has its own separate, but unique, genealogy.  
The natural way to do this is to identify an organism (or an organism’s genealogy) 
with a single genome type.3  An intestinal bacterium has a separate genome from 
its host’s genome, so they are separate organisms.4   
 Despite the fact that organisms are clearly more than just their genomes, 
thinking about the role that genealogy plays in taxonomy leads to the view that for 
many purposes, the genealogy of genomes is in some sense more fundamental for 
phylogeny than the history of 'whole organisms' in the more conventional sense of 
the term.  Nevertheless, looking solely at an organism's genome does not solve the 
multiple origins problem – genomes themselves often do not have unique 
genealogies.  Just as species are composed of organisms that have different 
genealogical histories, organisms themselves have parts (different genes) that 
have different genealogical histories. 
 Just as organisms have genealogies, genes also have genealogies.  Any 
token copy of a gene in some individual has the structure that it does because it 
inherited it through replication from some 'parent' gene.  Going back through 
many replication events, we eventually get to genes that were located in a 
different individual (usually a parent).  If we examine two token copies of a gene 
(whether in two different individuals or in the same individual), they share a 
common ancestor in the past which is called the point of coalescence.  The study 
of gene genealogies within a population (or set of taxa) is called coalescent theory 
and has become an important part of modern population genetics (Halliburton 
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[2004]; Hein et al. [2005]).  Exactly how the genealogy of genes relates to 
taxonomy is the subject of the remainder of this paper. 
 
3 Gene genealogies 
I have just cited a few problems with the organismal conception of the Tree of 
Life.  I do think that whole organism genealogical studies are important for many 
projects in modern biology and there are important problems that require us to 
think about phylogenies in this way.  I will come back to these points at the end of 
the paper.  Now I will present a third way of understanding genealogy; one based 
on genetic histories.  To understand how taxonomy might be affected by the 
genealogy of genes, we have to first understand exactly what genealogy means at 
this level of biological organization. 
 It is easy to see that different genes in an organism can have different 
histories.  In purely asexual organisms, during reproduction, the entire genome is 
passed from parent to offspring and so all genes will have concordant (identical) 
histories.  However, in biparental organisms, the genome is made up of a set of 
genes, a subset of which came from each parent.  In the case of lateral gene 
transfer, a subset of genes is passed from one organism to another without this 
involving an act of reproduction.  Like sexual reproduction, this also causes 
different genes in the same genome to have discordant (non-identical) histories. 
 If homologous genes (genes that are 'the same gene' because they share 
common ancestry – for example, they are cytochrome c genes) are sampled from 
two organisms, we can ask, 'How far back in time do these genic lineages 
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coalesce?'  The more recently they coalesce, the more closely related the genes 
are.  We say that gene copy A is more closely related to copy B than it is to copy 
C if A and B coalesce with each other more recently than either does with C.  This 
is completely analogous to the case of common ancestry of uniparental organisms 
in which there is no lateral transfer.  If genes here are, by definition, non-
recombining genetic elements, each gene has a unique genealogical history and 
gene genealogies form strictly divergent branching trees.   
 Figure 1 represents the history of a number of copies of a homologous 
gene present in different individuals in a population.  The organisms are diploids, 
meaning that they have two copies of each homologous chromosome represented 
by two connected circles.  The vertical lines are lines of gene descent from parent 
to offspring.  Some organisms pass on multiple copies of the gene while others 
pass on none.  
The lineages in bold represent a single token gene (a copy of a single 
allele) and all of its descendents as they spread through the population.  If we 
sample a number of copies of this gene at the tips (A-F) they will form a tree 
based on their times of coalescence with the other tips.  In this case, token copy A 
is more closely related to token copy C than to token copy B since A and C 
coalesce one generation more recently.  Since each gene has only one parent, gene 
genealogies are purely diverging trees.  If we extended this population back 
through time, eventually we would get to a point where we could trace the history 
of all 16 copies of the gene at the present time back to their most recent common 
ancestor (MRCA).   
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 Within a single population of organisms, different genes can form 
different trees.  For some genes, my sister and I have copies that coalesce in one 
of our parents.  For other genes, they coalesce very deeply in the past.  So the full 
network of organismal genealogies does not determine any of the gene 
genealogies.  Not every genetic lineage goes through the most recent common 
ancestor of two organisms.  If phylogenetic trees are to be useful for tracing the 
histories of traits and traits are at least partially determined by gene histories, then 
knowing only the organismal histories (and only a fraction of the organismal 
history when we are basing our taxa only on MRCAs) will not suffice to fully 
understand the history of heritable traits.  Knowing only about recency of 
Figure 1.  A population of organisms with the history of a single gene  (a 
copy of a single allele) highlighted.  The diagram is inspired by those in 
Maddison (1995). 
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common ancestry at the organismal level provides only an incomplete 
genealogical history of the traits those organisms have. 
 While it is obvious that different genes have different trees within a 
population, it is less obvious is that different genes indicate different relationships 
between populations.  Of course, in cases of horizontal gene transfer, this is clear.  
If a bacterium transfers a gene to a human, that gene will suggest that the human 
is closer to a particular group of bacteria than to chimpanzees.  Any non-
transferred genes would indicate otherwise.  Disagreement among gene trees 
could also be the result of species hybridization or even symbiogenesis (the 
merging of two organisms).  But as modern phylogenetic studies have made clear, 
disagreement among gene trees is common, and is to be expected as the result of 
ordinary branching speciation events.   
 In many cases, two copies of a gene in a single population will coalesce 
earlier in time than when that population split from another.  But this means that a 
copy of a gene is often more closely related to a copy from another population 
than it is to some copies in its own population.  And 'population' is just a 
placeholder here – this kind of non-exclusivity extends above the level of 
traditional species: often gene copies in one species are closer to copies in another 
species than to other copies in its own species.  If the time to coalescence extends 
past two speciation events, then we can have gene discordance at the level of 
species histories.  In other words, gene tree topologies can differ from the 
topology of the corresponding 'species tree'.  For example, if we sampled a gene 
from a human, a chimp, and a gorilla, the expectation is that the genes from the 
  11 
human and the chimp would coalesce more recently with each other than either 
does with the one from a gorilla.  But because some gene coalescent times are 
very different than others, some genes will exhibit different histories than this – 
some genes will indicate that humans and gorillas form a clade and others will 
indicate that chimps and gorillas do.  This is possible even if we have defined 
human, chimp, and gorilla in a way that guarantees that the organisms in each 
form genealogically exclusive groups. 
 Figure 2 provides an example of how gene trees can indicate relationships 
that differ from those given by species trees. 
 
 
In this case, the 'fat branches' represent organismal histories while the single dots 
represent token copies of genes and the skinny black lines are the genic lineages.  
In this case, while the organisms at the tips in C are more closely related to those 
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in B than to those in A, this particular gene has a history in which A and B from a 
clade that does not include C.  
 Since the 1980's, this phenomenon has become widely known and studied 
and is typically referred to as the relationship between gene trees and species trees 
(Tateno et al. [1982]; Hudson [1983]; Tajima [1983]; Wilson et al. [1985]).  Since 
gene sequences are the primary evidence used to infer phylogenies of taxa, at the 
very minimum this presents an important epistemological issue in attempting to 
infer phylogenies.  If we simply sampled one copy of a homologous gene from a 
number of taxa, even if we were able to correctly infer the phylogeny of the gene, 
the gene need not have the same phylogeny as the taxa we wish to study.  The 
problem is not restricted to genes per se.  Imagine the over-simplistic case where 
a phenotypic character is completely controlled by one gene.  This means that the 
character distribution represents misleading data, but not because of homoplasy as 
is typically assumed, but because the branching history of the character really is 
just different from the branching history of the taxa.   
 While this is a very important issue, it could be merely an epistemological 
difficulty.  We can acknowledge that genes have genealogies just like organisms, 
populations, species, and taxa do, and that the genealogical relations at these 
varying levels are just different.  When building species trees, if we could ignore 
gene histories and directly infer the history of species, we would do that.  But 
there are other possible responses – such as that in some important metaphysical 
sense, the genealogy of organisms or species (or both) just is (or maybe is 
determined by) the genealogy of genes.  As Maddison ([1995]) puts it, 'one 
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possible interpretation of a species phylogeny is that it depicts the lines by which 
genetic information was passed on and nothing more' (Maddison [1995], p. 285).  
Maddison interprets Baum ([1992]) and Baum and Shaw ([1995]) as holding this 
position, though it is not clear that they do. 
 On this view, a species phylogeny is composed directly of gene trees and 
the genealogical relationships among these species do not form a single branching 
pattern, but rather are composed of a number of branching patterns.  A species 
tree is thus a 'statistical distribution' of gene trees which might be conveyed by a 
statement like 'half of the genes in species A-D show a D(C(B,A)) topology but 
three other topologies are represented by 30, 15, and 5 percent of the genes' 
(Figure 3).   
 
 
  14 
 
In the end Maddison rejects this position because it 'views populations as just 
bags of genes that happen to have been entangled in their history' (Maddison 
[1995], p. 286), though he is a bit more favorable to the position in (Maddison 
[1997]).   
 While this is a rather stark view of the nature of populations, species, or 
taxa generally, Maddison does point out the benefits that this view has for 
thinking about phylogeny.  For inferences that rely on phylogenies, we are 
concerned with the actual, historical distribution of traits (like genes) and facts 
about what could have happened but did not happen are irrelevant.  What 
Maddison fails to realize is that phylogenies can have the required properties 
without this entailing the stark metaphysical picture that says species are just 
collections of genes.  We can still define taxa such as species as groups of 
organisms where the organisms are genealogically related; we just need to 
understand phylogeny in a way that properly takes these gene genealogies into 
account. 
 
4 Exclusivity as recentness of genetic coalescence 
In order for a species, or any taxon, to have a unique genealogy, it must be 
composed of a genealogically exclusive group of organisms.  Again, an exclusive 
group is roughly, a group of organisms that are more closely related to each other 
than to any organisms outside the group.  A natural way to define how closely 
related two organisms are is in terms of their recentness of common ancestry.  But 
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we know that not all of our genes come from our most recent common ancestors.  
So perhaps we need to have a broader understanding of genealogical relatedness 
that takes this into account.  For example, on the MRCA view, siblings are more 
closely related than first cousins are because they share a parent rather than just a 
grandparent as their MRCA.  Notice that only one common ancestor determines 
this relationship.  On this view, two half-siblings are just as closely related as two 
full siblings are.  An alternate way to think about the situation is that full siblings 
are more closely related than half-siblings because they share two parents, not just 
one.  An explanation of this fact that you might find in an introductory genetics 
text is that half-siblings are expected to share one quarter of their genes whereas 
siblings are expected to share one half.5  With more distant relationships, it 
becomes more obvious that we may be more concerned with trying to combine 
the history of a number of our ancestors rather than simply being concerned with 
a single ancestor in common who happens to be the most recent of all of a large 
number of distinct common ancestors that we might share.  
  Genetic relatedness provides a way to measure relatedness that can come 
apart from recency of organismic common ancestry.  Since different genes have 
different histories, we have to think of the organism’s genealogy as a combination 
of gene histories.  This takes into account the idea that not all of an organism’s 
genes are passed down from a single ancestor. 
 One way of doing this is to alter our understanding of what an exclusive 
group of organisms is.  A precise definition of exclusivity in terms of common 
ancestry has been developed by David Baum in collaboration with Elliott Sober 
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and Joel Velasco (Baum [2009]; Velasco [2009]).  However, we could also define 
exclusivity in terms of gene histories and historically, it was first made precise in 
this way.  Baum and Shaw ([1995]) define an exclusive group of organisms as 
one whose genes coalesce more recently within the group than between any 
member of the group and any organism outside the group.  To hold on to the view 
that species have a unique place on the Tree of Life, they then use this definition 
in what they call the 'Genealogical Species Concept' (GSC), which holds that a 
species is an exclusive group with no exclusive groups inside it. 
 This definition does seem to implicitly define exclusivity as what we 
might call '100% exclusivity' where every gene must have a within-group 
coalescence.  This definition has a number of interesting consequences.  One is 
that since gene trees are strictly diverging, we can be sure that exclusive groups 
really can be treated as a phylogenetic unit with a unique position in any 
phylogeny.  The phylogenies of a number of exclusive groups will form a strict 
hierarchy and thus can be represented as a diverging tree.  Another interesting 
consequence is that it removes the possibility of gene trees disagreeing with 
'species trees'.  If you do have a gene tree that disagrees with what you thought the 
species tree was, either you have inferred the gene tree incorrectly, you are wrong 
about the species tree, or you are mistaken about which groups are species.   
 These 100% exclusive groups have a number of very useful properties 
from the standpoint of phylogenetics precisely because their definition entails that 
they will form a precise nested hierarchy.  But we have not truly gotten rid of the 
discordance among gene trees – rather, all we have done is shifted the border 
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between interspecies relationships (the diverging relationships which are 
traditionally in the realm of systematics) and intraspecies relationships (the 
reticulate, network-like relationships which are traditionally outside the realm of 
systematics.)  Rather than recognizing that the border between strictly diverging 
and even somewhat reticulate does not lie where we have traditionally located 
species, Baum and Shaw have simply defined species as being precisely at this 
border.  But as we will see, despite its theoretical virtues, this view is simply too 
radical in its consequences concerning which groups we should call species. 
 
5 From 100% to less 
Requiring of an exclusive group that all of its genes coalesce more recently with 
each other than with any outside genes is a very stringent requirement.  While it is 
true that if two populations are isolated long enough, drift alone will eventually 
lead to each being exclusive with respect to the other, achieving this 'reciprocal 
exclusivity' can take a very long time.  Any instance of horizontal gene transfer 
instantly collapses the source and recipient into the same exclusive group, which 
is a taxonomic disaster.  But even with ad hoc adjustments to our definition so we 
are only interested in the vertical history of genes, 100% exclusivity is still far too 
strong.  Some polymorphisms which survive through lineage splits may be under 
balancing or frequency dependent selection, meaning that there will be pressure to 
keep at least two different types of alleles in the population.  As long as the 
polymorphism persists, that gene will not show an exclusivity pattern concordant 
with other genes in the population.   
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 These polymorphisms often exhibit coalescent times well past 
conventionally defined borders for species.  For example, the major 
histocompatibility complex (MHC) is a large gene family that plays an important 
role in the immune system and can be found in most vertebrates.  These genes 
contain the most extreme examples known of genetic polymorphisms in humans 
with the HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DRB1 genes having roughly 250, 500, and 
300 known alleles respectively.  There are a number of possible explanations for 
how such extreme diversity could exist; for example, it may partially be the result 
of frequency dependent selection driven by pathogens.  Since pathogens will 
evolve to attack the most common type of defense, genes in the minority will 
have an advantage.  Clearly, the precise explanation does not matter here – what 
matters is that many of these polymorphisms are ancient, having existed for 
millions of years.   
Figueroa et al. ([1988]) and Lawler et al. ([1988]) show that many of these 
polymorphisms predate the split of chimpanzees and humans, meaning that some 
human copies will be closer to chimpanzee copies than to other human copies.  
This means that if we enforce 100% exclusivity requirements, humans and chimps 
will have to be the same species.  Ayala and Escalante ([1996]) suggest that some 
could be far older – perhaps as old as 30 million years as some human alleles 
appear to be more closely related to those of orangutans and even some old world 
monkeys.  If this were correct, it is likely that the smallest exclusive group that 
contains all humans would be the entire clade Catarrhini consisting of Old World 
monkeys and the Apes (currently classified as approximately 100 extant species).  
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This group would itself either be a species, or more likely, it may have some 
smaller exclusive groups within it so groups such as humans would be 
metaspecies (not part of any basal exclusive group and so part of no species).  
While this view does place species on firm ontological ground, it lacks much of 
the important theoretical and practical virtues in recognizing that there are 
genuine phylogenetic histories of far smaller groups (like humans). 
This account is simply too radical to be an account of species.  Just how 
conservative a species concept has to be will depend on other virtues that it has 
and how it compares to other concepts.  I would suggest that it is not obvious that 
Homo sapiens (as currently understood) exactly delimits a species – for example, 
perhaps Homo neanderthalensis should be lumped together with it.  However, a 
reasonable criterion would surely recognize that humans and chimpanzees are 
different species.  If we did shift the meaning of species so that there could not be 
any discordant gene histories between species, then we would simply need to 
invent another taxonomic rank (perhaps subspecies) which would recognize 
groups such as humans and chimpanzees and would end up functioning in almost 
precisely the way that 'species' functions now. 
 An obvious fix is to suggest that 100% exclusivity is not required for a 
group to form a taxon.  Shaw ([2001]) drops the strict requirement and says, 
'Exclusivity, where members of the daughter population are more closely related 
to each other than to organisms outside the population, applies once the majority 
of gene copies each find their closest genealogical relative within that population' 
(Shaw [2001], p.881) (emphasis added).  Dawkins ([2004]) also suggests that in 
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the future, we will think of phylogenies as recording what is true for a majority of 
genes.   
 Baum ([2007]) points out that 50% is an arbitrary cutoff that has no real 
biological importance and instead suggests that the best concept of exclusivity 
makes use of what he calls 'concordance factors' – the proportion of the genome 
for which a given clade is true.  An exclusive group is simply any clade that has a 
higher concordance factor than any contradictory clade.  This view suggests that a 
divergent phylogeny arises over time and that there may be no precise moment at 
which reticulating network histories suddenly diverge.  The 'primary concordance 
tree', which represents all of the exclusive groups, is thus not the 'full' Tree of Life 
which respects all aspects of genealogy; rather, it is something like the best single 
tree that gets the most right (with respect to gene genealogies) if you have to pick 
just one tree. 
 The primary concordance tree is useful for taxonomy precisely because it 
is a single tree and so we can use it as a basis for phylogenetic classification.  
There is an obvious correspondence between a tree and a hierarchy of groups 
within groups, which is an important goal, if not a requirement, of a taxonomy.  
This tree serves the purposes of classification, but the real, 'full' genealogical 
history is a very complicated collection of gene trees.  Many of these will overlap 
and this overlap is what is represented on the primary concordance tree, but genes 
that have histories that differ from most other genes have real histories too that 
should not be dismissed or suppressed as some type of 'error'.  Rather, each gene 
has a real history.  There is a difficult practical question of how to present as 
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much relevant information as possible in a precise but compressed way, but there 
are no serious ontological difficulties with this picture of phylogenetic history as 
the history of genes.6 
 It should be noted that concordance factors were developed to describe the 
meaning of phylogeny.  They do not, by themselves, immediately lead to any 
specific definition of species.  On a phylogenetic view of taxonomy, all taxa must 
be clades.  The gene-based concordance view says that by ‘clades’ here, we mean 
clades on the primary concordance tree, which are exclusive groups.  A 
phylogenetic view of species says that since species are taxa, they must be clades 
as well.  But which clades are species?  That is ranking question which remains to 
be answered.  A variety of answers are possible – for example, Baum (2009) 
argues that there is no single, objective ranking criterion, but rather, we should 
use a set of ‘semi-subjective’ criteria.  But importantly, however ranking is 
determined, as long as species as necessarily exclusive groups, then any tree of 
species will be consistent with the primary concordance tree. 
 We have now moved to a view in which phylogenies represent statistical 
distributions of gene genealogies just as Maddison described.  But rather than 
adopt the picture of taxa as nothing but 'bags of genes', we have traveled through 
the very natural route of thinking of taxa (and therefore, species) as groups of 
organisms that form genealogical units.  What has changed is simply how we 
measure how closely organisms are related to each other.  The idea that the 
genealogy of an organism is tied to the genealogy of its genes is a consequence of 
understanding what kind of properties genealogies are supposed to have.  
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Genealogies are supposed to represent the actual historical paths that allowed 
various bits of information from past organisms to causally influence the traits of 
organisms today.  A precise understanding would have to restrict the causal 
relation in question using some sort of heritability conditions, but this need not be 
dealt with here.  While genes do not capture all of the relevant heritable 
information, genes are obviously a large part of our genealogical history and 
ignoring discordant gene histories, as the whole organism based view of the tree 
does, leaves us with a concept of phylogeny cannot represent an important aspect 
of evolutionary history. 
  
6 Criticisms of the genealogical species concept 
While this gene-based version of a phylogenetic species concept has received 
relatively little attention in the literature, there have been some criticisms, which I 
will examine here.  In their book Speciation, Coyne and Orr defend the popular 
Biological Species Concept (BSC), which they define in the most common way, 
as 'Species are groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups' (Coyne and Orr [2004], p. 30).  Coyne and Orr 
argue that something akin to the 'relaxed' version of the Genealogical Species 
Concept (GSC) above is the best phylogenetic concept, which in turn they seem to 
take to be the most serious alternative to the BSC.  They then argue that the BSC 
should be favored over the GSC (Coyne and Orr [2004], pp. 467-70).   
 Coyne and Orr favor the BSC over this relaxed version of the GSC for 
three reasons.  First, they say that the GSC results in many groups not being 
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members of any species at all.7  Their main concern seems to be the way in which 
metaspecies are formed: 'At the moment when an isolated population becomes 
monophyletic [to be a criticism of the GSC, this should read 'exclusive' which is 
different from monophyletic], every individual in every other population instantly 
loses its status as belonging to any species.  It seems odd that, without any change 
in its own genetic composition, a group can lose species status based on what 
happens in a remote population' (Coyne and Orr [2004], p. 467).   
 First, we should clarify exactly the kind of case Coyne and Orr have in 
mind.  It is actually impossible for a group that counts as a species to lose this 
status on the GSC view (unless it becomes a higher taxon).  What they have in 
mind is that a new species forms from within a larger species.  Then, according to 
Coyne and Orr, this leaves the remainder of the old species not inside any species. 
 This criticism is problematic on several fronts.  In the first place, the entire 
problem relies on the existence of a precise moment of speciation within the 
lifetime of individual organisms that is in no way required by the GSC.  In fact, 
relying on tracking species through time already borders on question begging 
against an exclusivity view of classification that is explicitly synchronic.  But if 
we are concerned about species through time, there are some obvious ways of 
trying to extend time-limited groups to time-extended groups (Baum [1998]) so it 
might be possible to proceed in examining this criticism.   
  Not only do Coyne and Orr incorrectly assume that the GSC attempts to 
track species through time, they also assume that once a group within a species 
becomes monophyletic [exclusive] it must be a new species.  This relies on a 
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particular criterion of ranking – namely, that species are by definition, basal 
exclusive groups (as in Baum and Shaw [1995]).  This criterion may make sense 
on the 100% exclusivity idea (in which case their example of Drosophilia 
simulans is not an example), but is obviously inappropriate for the plurality 
concept.  For example, two siblings might share 50% of their genes and so will 
form an exclusive group, but of course they are not a new species.  On the relaxed 
version of the GSC, ranking is made using other criteria and we are not required 
to have metaspecies at all – every organism can be a member of one and only one 
species and so there are no metaspecies (Baum [2009]).   
 A factor in this first criticism was that a population could change what 
species it is in without any genetic or phenotypic changes to the organisms in a 
population.  This idea is repeated in their second criticism, that 'little of biological 
import occurs at the completion of genealogical speciation.  What significance, 
for example, can one impute to the moment at which the proportion of loci 
showing exclusivity rises from 50% to 50.1%?'  As argued before, 50% is an 
arbitrary benchmark, which is why Baum ([2007]) and ([2009]) uses a plurality 
concept where the clade simply has a higher concordance factor than any other 
contradictory clade.  Here, if we track changes through time, we will say that new 
exclusive groups arise when there is a change in which clade represents the most 
common pattern.  At what precise point is there enough divergence to represent a 
change from one taxon to two?  It is impossible to say.  But this is a strength of 
the view, not a problem.  As Baum says, 'I would propose that the search for a 
particular CF [concordance factor] threshold that denotes the boundary between 
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reticulation and divergence is doomed.  The acquisition of a divergent structure 
accrues gradually as a result of gene lineage extinction in reproductively isolated 
populations or demes (see, for example, Avise and Ball [1990]; Avise and 
Wollenberg [1997]; Maddison [1997])' (Baum [2007], pp. 425-6). 
 The third criticism that Coyne and Orr make represents a real difference in 
the goals of the systematist who favors the GSC and one who favors the BSC and 
it is hard to see how any response can be adequate without question begging.  But 
I will attempt a brief defense here.  The criticism centers around the idea that 
genealogical speciation will often be transitory since allopatric populations may 
become exclusive without being intrinsically isolated from other species and this 
is no guarantee that they will stay exclusive when reproductive barriers are 
removed.  The evolution of intrinsic barriers to reproduction is no guarantee that 
there will always be such barriers, but it is surely correct that external barriers 
such as geographical separation are much more fluid and apt to change over 
evolutionary time.  This type of comparison between the BSC and versions of 
phylogenetic concepts can be found elsewhere such as in Avise and Ball ([1990]), 
Avise and Wollenberg ([1997]), and Avise ([2000]).   
 If we delimit taxa based only on actual reproductive history and ignore the 
difference between temporary and permanent barriers as versions of the PSC do, 
then our current taxa might not stay taxa.  The focus of Coyne and Orr ([2004]) 
throughout is to describe the importance of gene flow and reproductive isolation 
in population genetics.  For them, species are the fundamental units of evolution.  
An opposing goal represented by Nelson ([1979]), Donoghue ([1985]), and 
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virtually all defenders of phylogenetic species concepts is to determine what 
species concept fits best in systematic theory.  In systematic theory, our primary 
interest is in recovering and representing evolutionary history.  In systematics, 
species play the role of the fundamental units of phylogeny.  We can describe 
patterns of distribution of traits across taxa without any reference to units of 
evolution or possible patterns in the future. 
 The BSC delimits species by their potential for sharing descendants.  
Versions of the PSC group organisms by their shared ancestry.  Which is better?  
Obviously, the best concept will depend on what we use the species concept for 
(Baum and Donoghue [1995]).  Hybrid views which allow non-genealogical 
groups to be species, but then demand that these same species be the fundamental 
units in a phylogenetic taxonomy are unacceptable.  It may be a consistent 
position to use 'species' to refer to special groups such as reproductively 
compatible groups and then simply invent a new term for fundamental taxa which 
are the basic units in a phylogenetic classification, but this is not the typical 
strategy of defenders of the BSC.  Rather, they agree that species are taxonomic 
units and that higher taxa are groups of species delimited by their history, and 
they argue that the BSC is the proper way to delimit such groups since species, 
unlike other taxa, are special and have an additional role to play.  But nothing 
could play both roles.  If species are to be units of phylogeny, they must be 
genealogical units which are united by their past. 
 Taxa that are united by their unique, shared past need not stay that way.  
But there is no particular reason that they must stay that way in order to serve the 
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central purposes of systematics – recovering and representing evolutionary 
history.  It is certainly of biological interest to determine which of these groups 
are likely to stay exclusive, but like allowing paraphyletic groups as taxa, 
attempting to build these forward-looking interests into the definition of taxa 
necessarily disrupts the central goals of systematics (de Queiroz [1988]).   
 
7 The Tree of Life? 
It is obvious that the study of gene genealogies is an important part of biology.  
Gene genealogies also provide an important source of evidence for organism 
pedigrees.  Certainly, organisms have real genealogies that we might have a 
practical reason to care about, but it might be thought that, biologically, all of the 
interesting genealogical action takes place at the level of genes.  I do not think 
that this is right.  While concordance factors are valuable tools in understanding 
exactly what phylogenies represent, organisms really do have a history of their 
own that is valuable for certain biological purposes.  There are many processes 
and forces of evolution that act on whole organisms and not on genes directly.  
Careful study of such processes may require that we understand the specific 
patterns of mating between organisms independently of knowing anything about 
which genes are in which organisms.  For example, monophyletic groups of 
organisms are valuable when tracing biogeographical patterns across time and 
space because geographic range is a heritable trait from parent to offspring.  Here, 
it is appropriate to think of lineages of organisms on their own terms rather than 
being defined by how closely related their genes are.  And of course, there is far 
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more to heredity than genes.  Studying phenomena such as epigenetic changes 
requires examining organismal pedigrees independent of any gene genealogies.  
Essentially, the whole field of developmental systems theory depends on looking 
at the history of whole organisms as opposed to just their genes (Oyama [2000]).   
 Where does this leave us with respect to the Tree of Life?  On the 
organism-based view, the Tree of Life connects all organisms via parent-offspring 
reproductive relationships.  On the gene-centric picture of species, all taxa, 
including species, occupy a particular place on what can be called the 'primary 
concordance tree' (Baum [2007]).  This tree is something like the single 
phylogenetic tree that gets the most right if we have to pick just one tree.  But 
each gene has a unique tree and there are multiple Trees of Life, each of which is 
objectively correct.  This seems to lead back to the Maddisonian picture of 
phylogeny with a particular view of taxonomy added on.  To get a single 
diachronic object, we could take all of these gene trees and combine them in a 
single representation that we might call the 'Web of Life' or the 'Net of Life' 
(Kunin et al. [2005]) or the 'Synthesis of Life' (Bapteste et al. [2004]).   
 In light of the disagreement between various understandings of the Tree 
and how it relates to classification, phylogeny, and genealogy, what happens to 
our apparent starting place that species and other taxa should occupy a particular 
place on the Tree of Life?  A view of exclusivity such as (Velasco [2009]) keeps 
to this tradition, though as lateral gene transfer and other causes of gene tree 
discordance increase, these taxa will be driven farther apart from the taxa 
described by concepts based on genetic coalescence.  These gene-based views 
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hold that taxa have a unique place on the primary concordance tree.  Which tree is 
important to biology?  Clearly, they both are.   
Genes have real genealogies that are biologically important to study.  
Organisms have genealogical histories that are important to study.  Once we 
specify each of these two levels, it becomes easier to see that there is no 
independent third level 'the species level' that has a genealogy that is important to 
study.  If we insist on a view of species that is not simply reducible to either of 
these lower levels, and then we insist that species have genealogies as defined by 
speciation events, we can construct a 'phylogeny' of species, but it would not 
function in biological explanations in the way that we want it to.  Species would 
have ancestors and thus genealogies, but these genealogical histories would not 
track heritable traits over time, since these follow the gene histories and are 
constrained by organism pedigrees.  In cases where this species genealogy 
conflicts with these lower level histories, it is unclear why we should accept that 
the concept of genealogy applies at the species level at all. 
 Of course, we can sensibly talk about relationships between species.  The 
history of a species, like any taxon, is just is the history of the organisms in it.  
This is the 'reductionist' part of the picture I would defend.  On the other hand, 
organisms have histories independent of the histories of their genes, that is why 
there are two levels rather than just one.  If species are exclusive groups of 
organisms, then it makes perfect sense to talk about the genealogy of a species.  
Exclusive groups of organisms could be defined either in terms of organism 
pedigrees or in terms of gene genealogies.  Each is biologically important for 
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certain types of explanations.  Either gives us a sensible way to talk about species 
as units of phylogeny.   
 
Endnotes 
1. I say 'reductive' because the genealogy of a species supervenes on the lower 
level genealogies of organisms.  I put 'reductive' in quotes because on some 
understandings of reduction, to reduce species genealogy implies that species do 
not have genealogies.  I do not want to assume this eliminative form of 
reductionism. 
 
2. This analogy comes from a discussion by Elliott Sober at the 'Questioning the 
Tree of Life' session at the 2008 Philosophy of Science Association meeting in 
Pittsburgh, PA. 
 
3. I say 'type' here so that multiple cells in my body, which arguably have 
different token genomes (or definitely do in the case of mutations) can still be a 
part of me.  Worries about monozygotic twins and the like might require an extra 
clause.   
 
4. There are disputes about what counts as a single genome, but on every view, 
gut bacteria have a different genome.  On my view, mitochondrial DNA is part of 
the human genome since it is inside the cell.  Thus mitochondria (now) are not 
separate organisms.  On other views, they are not part of the human genome and 
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so by my definition, they are separate organisms.  I take this to be an unacceptable 
conclusion so I am relying on defining the genome in a way that rules that out.   
 
5. 'Sharing one half of their genes' is a common way of expressing a particular 
relationship that is very difficult to describe.  With siblings, it is equivalent to 
claiming that the expectation is that one half of their genes will coalesce in one or 
the other of their parents whereas with half-siblings, one quarter of their genes are 
expected to coalesce in a parent.  But this type of translation is difficult to 
generalize.  For example, we say that siblings whose parents are themselves 
cousins share 9/16 of their genes (of the 50% of their homologous genes that 
come from different parents, 1/8 of them will be shared between the parents since 
they are cousins so 1/2+1/8*1/2 = 9/16).  In this case, 9/16ths of their genes are 
expected to coalesce within the last three generations, not just within the parents. 
 
6. I say there are no 'serious' difficulties, but there certainly are difficulties.  
Details of the view can be found in (Baum [2007] and [2009]), but they leave 
many technical questions open.  For example, to calculate a concordance factor, 
we need to know the 'percentage of the genome that forms a clade'.  But how is 
this calculated?  Does each gene count equally?  Or each base pair so that longer 
genes have heavier weights?  What about genes that have homologues in some, 
but not all of the taxa under study?  There are multiple ways of making this view 
precise; the only question is which of the ways is best.  But I would suggest that 
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for our purposes, the picture of taxa and genealogy is clear enough without these 
details.   
 
7. Every organism is part of some exclusive group.  But the smallest exclusive 
group it is in might have a smaller exclusive group inside it that doesn't contain 
the organism in question.  The 'leftover' organisms that aren't part of any basal 
exclusive group form a metaspecies (by the definition given in Baum and Shaw 
[1995]) – other papers such as (de Queiroz and Donoghue [1988]) use an 
epistemic definition which would not fit the example here). 
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